## EXHIBIT D

1		BANKRUPTCY COURT FRICT OF NEW YORK
2	IN RE:	Case No. 12-10511-scc
3	HEATH GLOBAL, INC.,	Chapter 11
4	Debtor.	One Bowling Green New York, New York 10004
5		June 9, 2014
6		12:04 p.m.
7	JIM MAGNER,	7001661
8	Plaintiff,	case No. 12 01004 See
9	vs.	
10	HEATH GLOBAL, INC.,	
11	Defendant.	
12		
13	TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING ON SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT FILED BY EDUARDO J. GLAS ON BEHALF OF JIM MAGNER; MOTION F	
14	SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON BEHALF (	OF DEFENDANT HEATH GLOBAL, INC.,
15	I I	LLEY C. CHAPMAN, UNITED STATES  JPTCY JUDGE
16	APPEARANCES:	
17	For the Debtor:	Delbello Donnellan Weingarten
18		Wise & Wiederkehr, LLP By: Jonathan S. Pasternak, Esq.
19		One North Lexington Avenue White Plans, New York 10601
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21	Also Present:	McCarter & English, LLP By: Eduardo J. Glas, Esq.
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1	Appearances continued:	
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8	Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording; transcript produced by transcription service.	
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1 (Time Noted: 12:04 p.m.) 2 THE COURT: Okay, so I've read everything, 3 multiple, multiple, multiple times. This round, previous rounds. We've been at this for a long time. 4 So, I have some thoughts. But is there anything 5 that anyone would like to say that's not reflected in all of 6 7 the papers? MR. GLAS: Can I answer, Your Honor? 8 9 THE COURT: Sure. MR. GLAS: Eduardo Glas, from McCarter and 10 11 English. 12 THE COURT: Yes. MR. GLAS: On behalf of Mr. Magner. I'm planning 13 to rely on the papers, Your Honor. 15 THE COURT: Okay. 16 MR. GLAS: I think the papers are pretty 17 comprehensive. THE COURT: Okay, thank you. 18 19 MR. PASTERNAK: We were almost going to say, Your Honor, it would be great if you just came in and made a 20 ruling. 21 2.2 THE COURT: Okay. MR. PASTERNAK: Because we both feel that we've 23 really adequately briefed the issues for Your Honor. 24 25 THE COURT: Okay.



MR. PASTERNAK: But if you have questions, of course --3 THE COURT: You've briefed the issues extensively, repeatedly, repetitively. 4 5 MR. PASTERNAK: Exhaustively. THE COURT: Exhaustively. And I've spent a great 6 7 deal of time thinking about this. 8 MR. PASTERNAK: Thank you. THE COURT: I don't have a prepared script, but 9 I'm prepared to go down all of the arguments and give you a 10 11 disposition that I think will be detailed enough so that you will have an adequate basis on which to go up on appeal, 12 which I assume that, you know, one of you is going to do. 13 mean, that's the thing about this case, which has been clear 14 from the very beginning, in the absence of a negotiated 15 settlement, it's up or down. 16 And in that kind of a situation, it's nice that 17 there be a settlement, but you folks clearly have declined my 18 suggestions, invitations, encouragements to settle. 19 So I'm going to give you a ruling, and I think 20 that, you know, you're going to end up -- there's a --21 22 whether or not you appeal is up to you.

So, let's start with what the District Court did and did not do.

All the District Court did, in my view, was the



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following two things:

One, agreed with me that there was no termination pre-petition. That's clear that that's what the District Court did.

Secondly, the District Court disagreed with me and said that this was not an option agreement.

My view in my previously issued decision was that it was an option agreement. That was clearly rejected by the District Court, and I respect that view, and we're now here on remand to determine, as the District Court put it, what rights -- remaining rights the Debtor has under the agreement.

The District Court did not discuss cure. The District Court did not discuss whether or not the contract was executory, and specifically left that, I think, to me to decide.

My recollection is that in an earlier round of pleadings, not the current set, there was some back and forth over whether or not the District Court determined that this was a secured transaction, because I believe that the District Court used the words "to secure performance."

But the District Court did not determine that this was a secured transaction.

So, we go back to now I am left with the question of what this agreement is and what the Debtor's rights are



under the agreement.

At the outset of the case, and it is significant,

I think, to note that this occurred at the outset of the

case, the Debtor took the position in its Schedules and other

pleadings that this was a secured transaction.

And I believe that the reason that position was taken was because with a secured transaction, a typical secured transaction, you have the ability to cure missed payments.

You have a mortgage, you have monthly payments that were due, you missed them. You go into default.

If you couldn't cure those through a Plan, there would be no point. And I think that was -- and I'm speculating somewhat, but I'm guessing that that, understandably, might have been one of the drivers behind characterizing the agreement as a secured transaction.

The agreement is not a secure transaction. In order for there to be a secure transaction, among other things, there would have to be something that remotely resembles a security agreement, and there is not.

And there would also have to be a pledge, if you will, of property and the liening up of property that's owned by the Debtor.

The domain name does not fit the bill. The domain name is in escrow. The Debtor does not have title to the



domain name. The Debtor cannot pledge something that it does not own as security, so it's not a secure transaction.

In an earlier argument, I pressed Mr. Pasternak quite hard on this point, and Mr. Pasternak said it's not an executory contract.

This gets us to the question of: Is it an executory contract?

And the first ground on which Mr. Magner says it's not an executory contract is that the Debtor is judicially estopped.

I believe that's correct.

Mr. Pasternak, I think, as a good lawyer would, says, "No, no, no, I was arguing in the alternative." And that's not a basis for judicial estoppel, or any other kind of estoppel, but I think there's more to it.

I think that the position was taken in the Schedules, in the initial filing, in many pleadings, and in argument. And I certainly would never want to back anyone into a corner, but I think it was properly recognized that it had to be one or the other.

Now that the sands have shifted a little bit, to take the position that it's an executory contract, there is prejudiced involved in that because the case proceeded in reliance on the position that it wasn't an executory contract.



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**ESQUIRE** 

Had there been any sense that there was some sort of pleading in the alternative at the stage of my first opinion, I would have disposed of that issue and said that I would have gone through all of the different permutations of what it could be.

So I believe that the Debtor is estopped at this point to seek to characterize the contract as an executory contract.

However, I want to take it several steps further, because I don't think that's the only basis on which I can and should rest my ruling.

Even if the Debtor were not estopped to maintain that this is an executory contract, I find that the contract is not an executory contract under the standard *Countrymen* analysis.

The only performance of any substance whatsoever that's yet to occur with respect to this contract is the payment of money.

In the latest round of pleadings, the Debtor pointed to various what I would characterize as negative covenant-type performances as an indicator that, in fact, there was performance due on both sides.

I don't believe that those so-called obligations elevate this contract to the level of being an executory contract.

I want to go further.

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Even if the contract were to be characterized as an executory contract, I don't believe that it is capable of being cured and assumed or assumed and cured.

And I would also note, with respect to each of these areas, including the estoppel point, that there was nothing that prevented the Debtor during the first 60 days of the case from obtaining clarification on this point, seeking an extension of time to cure, or otherwise seeking to deal with the 108 point.

The reasons that I don't believe the contract is capable of being assumed and cured are -- I'll state them in the alternative.

One, as I said at the outset, I don't believe that the District Court's opinion dealt with cure in 108. And I do not agree with the Debtor's conflating of 108 as it deals with termination, which the District Court clearly ruled required a second notice and 108 as it deals with cure, so that the time in which the Debtor would have been able to cure has since lapsed.

If I'm wrong, and, in fact, the District Court intended to encompass the cure provisions of 108, along with the termination provisions, I get to the additional point that the defaults in the contract are not capable of being cured because they are time of the essence type defaults.



In effect, the Debtor would have this contract be turned into an open-ended agreement in which it contracted to purchase the domain name pursuant to a set schedule, determined that it could not perform by making the payments that were due, and then, by affecting the filing in a way that precluded the Debtor from the -- I'm sorry, the counterparty from terminating, in essence gives the Debtor an openended, if you will, agreement, in which at the end of the day it tenders the contemplated payments on some time schedule, and then gets the domain name. And that's not what Mr.

And I believe that to construe 108 that way, and the provisions of the Code that deal with the assumption and assignment of executory contracts, would really create a very large loophole in the way this is supposed to operate, and give the Debtor, who is party to an executory contract, far more power than anything that's contemplated by the Bankruptcy Code.

So, notwithstanding the infirmities in the drafting of the opinion, I believe that this is a unique situation in which you have an un-terminated agreement that is either not executory, or, if it is executory, it's not capable of being assumed and cured.

What bolsters my view, as I struggled to figure out exactly what this was, I thought, well, is it a claim?



Magner contracted for.

Is this like a situation in which a widget manufacturer sells a debtor widgets, and then doesn't pay, and then the widget manufacturer, in the debtor's bankruptcy, there's an agreement, but they have a claim because the debtor has the widgets and the widget manufacturer doesn't have the money.

The difference is that the Debtor here doesn't have the widget. The widget is in escrow, and the Debtor is not entitled -- was not entitled to have the widget until it received payments. The payments that were bargained for were payments on those specific dates, which have come and gone.

Therefore, there is a failure of consideration and there's a contract that is incapable of being further performed in the absence of some kind of a waiver by Mr.

Magner.

Now, I acknowledge that in the latest rounds of pleadings, and I believe we're one week away from the deadline set for the filing of the Plan, the notion is that the agreement would be assumed, cured, sold, et cetera.

But, in order to do that, there has to be rights that reside in the Debtor, which the Debtor can address in the Plan.

And for the -- I think I count five different levels of reason that I've just articulated to you, I don't believe that there are any such remaining rights that could be dealt with by a Plan.



I recognize that it's a harsh result, but this

case has always been about a harsh result. It's always been

in the absence of a settlement, one party or the other, and

we've been at this for about two years.

If I'm wrong, I will rely on the District Court to tell me that I'm wrong.

The reason that I thought it was important to give you a decision today, is because if I take this under advisement it's going to go into a queue, which is unfortunately long at this point for the first time in my four years of being on this job. I have a queue of decisions that probably total about 1,000 pages of writing.

And I felt that it was wrong for both of you to have to wait for me to get to this and be kind of hanging out there, and only then commence an appellate process.

So, my attempt here is to be sufficiently detailed, so that if there are to be ensuing appeals, the District Court and/or ultimately the Circuit Court will understand the basis of my ruling. And that's why I've proceeded as I have here today.

MR. PASTERNAK: So, we'll take the ruling from the transcript of today's hearing?

THE COURT: Yes, and you can give me a -- work together to provide an order, and you can annex the transcript as exhibit A, and the order can recite that motion



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granted, motion denied, for the reasons set forth on the 1 record as reflected in the transcript attached hereto. 2 MR. PASTERNAK: Debtor has a Plan filing deadline, 3 Your Honor, of next Monday. 4 5 THE COURT: Right. MR. PASTERNAK: What do you suggest the Debtor do? 6 7 THE COURT: Well, I don't -- I'm not in the practice of giving legal advice. 8 9 MR. PASTERNAK: Right. Take that under 10 advisement. THE COURT: So, you know, I'm not dismissing the 11 12 case. MR. PASTERNAK: No, I mean, we're going to have to 13 appeal and see what happens there. But --14 15 THE COURT: And if it were the other way, Mr. -- I mean, we wrangled procedurally, and Mr. Glas convinced us 16 that, in fact, his view was that he couldn't appeal the 17 District Court's decision on the option issue until there was 18 19 this ruling. So now you have rulings that comprise, I think, 20 the full panoply of possibilities as to what this contract 21 is, and, therefore, in terms of an appeal, if you need a 22 finding with respect to this being suitable for an 23 interlocutory appeal, I think that's appropriate and I would 24



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give you such a finding in the order.

1 MR. PASTERNAK: Very well, Your Honor. 2 THE COURT: Now, Mr. Glas undoubtedly is not in such a hurry to go to the District Court, but Mr. Pasternak, 3 I would understand if you were. 4 But, the case remains pending. There is a 5 deadline to submit a Plan. 6 7 The request to lift the automatic stay for the 8 purpose of issuing a termination notice is denied. 9 And if there's any sense that there's something to 10 be worked out, that would be -- I would welcome the news. MR. PASTERNAK: I'm sure, Your Honor. Thank you. 11 12 THE COURT: Okay. 13 MR. PASTERNAK: Thank you very much. THE COURT: Thank you. 14 15 Thank you. MR. GLAS: 16 (Time noted: 12:24 p.m.) 17 18 19 2.0 21 22 23 24



CERTIFICATE

I, Randel Raison, certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the official electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter, to the best of my ability.

Panal Paison

June 11, 2014

Randel Raison

